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THE COMMON GOOD
AND SPECIAL
INTERESTS IN THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
REVEREND LADISLAS M. ORSY, S.J.*
INTRODUCTION
Case #1. There is the special interest of the trucking industry to in-
crease their efficiency and their profit. They are pressing the members of
Congress to vote for a law accepting wider trucks and double trailers. But
there is also the common good of all who have the right and liberty to
drive safely and reasonably comfortably on the nation's highways. How
can the two seemingly conflicting interests be reconciled?
Lots of other causes could be substituted for the interest of the
trucking industry, all representing a special interest, such as more plants
for nuclear energy, or the banning of nuclear energy; also aid for paro-
chial schools, special help for the aged or handicapped, and so forth.
In each one of these cases, the legislature is under pressure to sup-
port actively and promote a cause which, in itself, does represent a partic-
ular value. But the question arises if that particular value can be obtained
without upsetting, disturbing, or, at times, destroying the whole complex
structure of values that the whole community is pursuing.
Case #2, now in the Church. There is the particular interest of the
American dioceses to keep the privilege of using a simplified procedure
for deciding marriage cases, an important issue for them. But there is also
the common good of dispensing justice in a uniform way in the universal
Church. How should the two demands be balanced?
The questions that our inquiry is called to answer emerge quite natu-
rally from the cases mentioned: Can the legislator respond to the postu-
lates of special interests and to the demands of the common good at the
same time? How should he reconcile them? What kind of guidelines
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should he use?
Our aim is not to get lost in technicalities-how, in the concrete, the
weighing and pondering, the maneuvering and the politicking should go
on-but to go to a deeper level and to find some guidelines which can,
precisely, inspire the legislator to find the correct balance.
Right from the beginning, one-sided answers in black or white should
be excluded. We are in a realm where the shades change continuously.
Each case is different. Even if we shall be able to find a reasonably clear
answer in the abstract, it should still be qualified by saying that every
issue is an individual one and requires individual attention and adjust-
ment. We are speaking about balancing living forces in a social body, and
social bodies are not all that different from physical bodies of living
beings.
PART I
Let us begin by asking: how should we understand what the common
good is?
An elusive concept! It is not an object that we can see and touch and
feel. It is something behind all the tangible things that a community or
society may possess.
The late Pope John XXIII, in his encyclical Mater et Magistra, pro-
posed a good definition or description, quite serviceable for us. The com-
mon good is not a single object. It consists, rather, in all the conditions
and circumstances which create the opportunity and freedom for human
persons to grow and to reach their own perfection.
This definition or description may sound unduly philosophical and
abstract. As a matter of fact, it is amazingly practical and leads to down-
to-earth consequences. Let me just draw your attention to some of them.
It is an integrated understanding of common good. It says that the
totality of all conditions and circumstances in the community should be
in the service of the whole, not just of a part. No individual persons or
special interest groups must appropriate the common good for
themselves.
Please note the purpose (goal, finality) of the common good. While it
is the totality of all conditions and circumstances of living, it is there for
the sake of individual persons! It does not exist for the sake of the corpo-
rate body as such (state, city, etc.).
Classical Christian philosophers liked to express this in a different
way by saying that the state exists for the sake of the persons, not the
persons for the sake of the state. There is the radical difference between
Christian social philosophy and (let us say) Marxist theory. The conse-
quences for understanding human rights are far-reaching; e.g., Christian
tradition understands human rights as belonging to the person, being
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inalienable, to be respected by the political community; Marxist theory
sees human rights as belonging to the group as such, hence any individual
suspect of "anti-social" behavior can be, even must be eliminated; after
all he creates, danger for the social body.
The proposed understanding of the common good looks to the future,
in the best sense of the term, but is not futuristic. That is, it demands the
right conditions and circumstances for the future so that the persons can
grow and develop. (It is there that a person develops.) It follows that the
artificial preservation of past traditions and usages is not part of the com-
mon good.
While the definition may be abstract, it postulates very concrete
structures because unless those conditions and circumstances really exist,
they help no one.
Finally, this notion of common good is not something static, made
and enacted once and for all. Precisely because the persons in the future
may have new needs, the common good may change-indeed, it must
change. As the notion is dynamic, flexible, it speaks of a developing
reality.
PART II
We have some idea of what is the common good. Let us reflect now
on what is a particular interest.
Needless to say, in this inquiry, I restrict myself to reflecting on legit-
imate interests as opposed to illegitimate ones, such as the interests of
organized crime.
Let us begin by a contrast. I said that the common good is the total-
ity of conditions favoring the movement of human persons toward
perfecting themselves, toward achieving their destiny in the best sense. In
contrast, special interest groups intend to create conditions and circum-
stances which will facilitate, for them, the obtaining of values which are
dear to them only (such as bigger trucks, nuclear plants, special subsidies
for schools, special care for the sick, and so forth).
It would be quite easy to react by voicing an extreme opinion. Either
by saying that "since the special value pursued by a given interest group
is attractive, they should be granted what they ask for," or by saying that
"since the value is a particular one they are destroying the harmony of
the whole, hence their request should be rejected." Neither of these ex-
tremes will do. There is much more to the whole truth.
When special interest groups are pressing for new conditions and new
circumstances of life which should enable them to reach for and obtain
the values they cherish, they can truly represent valid requests; their
movement is like "surges of energy" in the social body, like forces of life
trying to break to the surface. Therefore, they should be treated with re-
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spect. They have a right to be heard. They have a right to enter into a
dialogue, a controversy, or even a battle. But they have a duty, also. They
have a strict duty to listen to the postulates of the common good, balance
it against their own desires, and if necessary to submit themselves to the
demands of the greater good, which is precisely the common good.
It follows that in a healthy social body, the emergence of special in-
terest groups is not a sickness, is not an aberration, is not even a nui-
sance, but it is manifestation of life. Without the ongoing pressure of spe-
cial interest groups, the common good could become atrophied, stale and
static, and be reduced to a kind of deadly formality. But the pursuit of a
special interest has value and meaning only in the context of the common
good. Not otherwise.
It follows also, in a very concrete way, that the citizens have the right
and duty to initiate processes to create favorable conditions and circum-
stances for obtaining goods and values cherished by particular groups. So
do special interest groups have a right and duty to go only as far as the
common good permits.
PART III
The task of the legislators now emerges with some clarity. They must
support the common structures which best enable all citizens to grow and
work for their own betterment, physically, socially, and spiritually. But
they must also keep themselves open to those "surges of energy" which
come from particular interest groups. And, they must balance the two,
perhaps in a new way, in every single particular case.
On the abstract level of philosophical reflection, we can state quite
forcefully that the legislator should determine the right hierarchy of val-
ues and let the more important prevail. That is, he should weigh and pon-
der the values the community can obtain through the conditions of free-
dom which the common good has created. Then, he should weigh and
ponder, equally, the values represented by a special interest group and
see what happens if he, the legislator, creates new channels in the com-
munity, meaning new conditions, new circumstances, new freedoms, for
obtaining these particular values. What kind of conflicts are likely to
arise? What kind of new harmonies are likely to come into existence? He
must reach his judgment accordingly.
Now all this sounds very clear and simple in the abstract, but no
nation, no authority, no legislator exists in the abstract.
On the practical level of political action, the natural conflict between
the demands of the common good and the postulates of special interest
groups will be resolved through the operation of the traditional structures
of our own democracy as we know it. There, often enough, the ideal which
can be determined abstractly cannot be obtained concretely. Therefore, a
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compromise must be made. And here a new principle comes into opera-
tion. A need for compromise can be, and indeed is often, part of the com-
mon good. It is not a denial of the ideal but its adaptation to the real.
It is here, in this concrete world, that the importance of persons
comes into the fore. Persons are the ones entrusted with the task of
weighing, pondering, and balancing the values to be obtained. And, it is
at this point that we must say there is simply no substitute for legislators
of common sense, sound judgment, and moral integrity. Ultimately, the
struggle between the common good and special interests in a democratic
country is in the hands of those persons who are empowered by the citi-
zenry to make laws for them.
If you have persons so qualified, of common sense, of sound judg-
ment, of moral integrity, democracy will work. Balances will be found, not
always absolutely the best, but nearly always, the best obtainable and
suitable in the circumstances, which is a remarkable achievement.
CONCLUSION
The philosopher's task is to show the rules of play in the world of
values, honest rules, good rules, but not always immediately applicable to
the real world. As you may remember, Plato rejoiced in such exercise.
The statesman's task is to see how much of the ideal can be planted
in this real world so that it really takes root and bears fruit hundredfold.
His solution may fall short of the very best, but it may still be the best
possible among the citizens, who come in all shapes and sizes with their
strengths and weaknesses. This is the realism of Aristotle.
So the real solution to the conflict between the common good and
special interests will be as good as the persons who construe these solu-
tions. It follows that the common good itself postulates an intelligent,
ongoing, and unrelenting effort to educate the citizens to be creative and
to pursue particular interests but always in harmony with the demands of
the common good.
